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Although  environmental economists have tended to focus  on efficiency issues,  the 
importance of equity in shaping environmental policy is increasingly being appreciated 
(Kristöm 2006). Distributional consequences are inextricably bound in many environmental 
policies as evidenced, for example, in the range of case studies discussed in Serrett and 
Johnstone (2006). However, the complexity of the notion of social justice confounds research 
into the equity principles  applied by the community in determining their distributional 
preferences.   
The environmental justice movement, both in principle and in terms of practical political 
action, emphasises the distributional implications of environmental change (Agyeman et al. 
2003). Tientenberg (2009, p.523) argues that paying attention to environmental justice is 
desirable for two reasons, one ethical and the other pragmatic.  
“The ethical dimension concerns whether the distribution of risks, benefits and costs 
is in accordance with the norms of social justice. The desire for just policies is a 
conventional complement to the desire for efficient policies. The pragmatic dimension 
emphasizes the relationship between the distributional burden and both the likelihood 
that environmental legislation will pass and its ultimate form.” 
Assessment of the distributional impacts of environmental policy alternatives can be based on 
criteria such as the economic status, ethnicity, age, geographical and temporal distribution of 
those who gain and those who lose. Social justice principles generally either formulate more 
specific interpretations of utilitarianism or apply alternative or complementary ethical 
frameworks such as rewards according to contribution, equality of opportunity or equality of  
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outcome (Banuri et al. 1996). This research uses a choice modelling (CM) case study of 
intergenerational distribution preferences to explore the application of justice principles by 
respondents in determining welfare maximising policy alternatives.  
Environmental policies affect the distribution of resources, both financial and environmental, 
between generations yet empirical understanding of the willingness of members of the current 
generation to sacrifice some of their own consumption opportunities to increase the 
consumption opportunities of future generations is very limited (Kopp and Portney 1999). 
The results of this research increase  our  understanding of intergenerational distribution 
preferences; in particular revealing positive preferences by the community toward the utility 
of future generations.   
The paper is structured as follows. Section two provides background on the application of 
social justice principles in determining intergenerational distribution  preferences. This 
highlights the welfare economic theoretical underpinnings of the analysis of equity 
preferences. Section three outlines the choice experiment designed to elicit intergenerational 
distribution preferences. Section four  provides  the results of the estimation of non-linear 
social welfare functions within a conditional logit framework. This analysis provides valuable 
insight into the social justice principles applied by respondents when confronted with the 
challenge of expressing social  welfare maximising preferences. The paper concludes in 
section five with a discussion of the implications of the findings.  
2.0 Background 
Welfare economic theory is based on the assumption that social justice preferences can be 
expressed in  a social  welfare function  (SWF).  Randall (1987) describes  a  SWF  as a 
mathematical relationship precisely expressing the societal preferences as to how economic  
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well-being should be distributed among the individual members of society. Therefore the 
SWF, W, is a function of utility Ui, for individuals, i=1…n in society. 
  ) ,... , ( 2 1 n U U U w W =                   (1) 
Each SWF represents one person’s view of the allocation of utility across individuals in 
society.  Assessment of policy options involves analysis of comparisons of changes in 
welfare. Myles (1995) asserts that the maximisation of a SWF is invariably adopted as the 
objective of policy in public economics.  
Consequently it is the estimation of the shape of the SWF that is of relevance. This involves 
estimating the utility of each individual in each state and aggregating the utilities to the SWF. 
Hence, the functional form of the SWF involves ethical judgements regarding the aggregation 
of individual utilities. The most common form of the SWF is the classical utilitarian, where 
the utilities of individuals, i…n, are summed and the aim is to maximise the sum of the 






i n U U U W
1
1 ) ... (
                   (2) 
This classical utilitarian or Benthamite welfare function, developed by Bentham (1789) and 
championed by economists such as Mill (1861), Edgeworth (1881), Marshall (1890) and 
Pigou (1920) has been, in many ways, the “official” theory of traditional welfare economics 
(Sen 2000). The classical utilitarian SWF assumes a linear relationship where the utility of 
each individual or group of individuals is treated equally when aggregating social welfare. 
Although the classical utilitarian SWF is the most generally applied SWF, other forms of the 
SWF have also been adopted in the welfare literature. They are reflected in assumptions  
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regarding the willingness to trade-off the utility or wellbeing of one individual for another 
and illustrated in the slope of the SWF or social marginal rate of substitution (SMRS). The 
slope of the SWF reflects inequality in terms of units of utility. It does not indicate 
indifference to inequality of income or consumption, because the marginal utility derived 
from an additional unit of consumption may vary between individuals (Johansson 1987). For 
example, a convex function assumes that the SMRS is diminishing with movement down the 
SWF. In some instances the further restriction of constant elasticity is imposed (Cowell and 
Gardiner 1999; Pearce 2006).  
In this paper the evidence of non-linear social welfare preferences, including the constant 
elasticity assumption, is explored within the context of the specific question of 
intergenerational distribution preferences. 
2.1 Intergenerational equity 
The question of intergenerational distribution involves decisions regarding the balance 
between consumption by the current generation and consumption in the future. The resources 
available for future production and consumption are  inherently dependent on the 
capital/consumption balance of the current generation. Hence, the intergenerational social 
justice preferences of the community are an integral distributional aspect of environmental 
policy.  
For example, the well-known Ramsey (1928) model, which is concerned with optimal growth 
and capital accumulation, takes the sum over time of instantaneous utilities from 
consumption as its measure of social performance. This utilitarian ethic assumes that equity 
between generations is adequately taken care of by adding one generation’s utility level to 
another’s and treating each generation equally. Each generation’s utility is assumed to depend  
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only on its own consumption. As a consequence, the utilitarian ethic suggests that any 
generation should only sacrifice a unit of utility when this leads to an increase of more than 
one unit of utility for any other generation.  
In  more recent times, intergenerational distributional issues are often raised under the banner 
of sustainability as sustainable development implies some general rule about not impairing 
the capability of future generations to achieve the same level of well-being as the current 
generation (Pezzey 1989). The strong link between sustainability and social justice between 
generations has resulted in policy debates increasingly considering intergenerational 
distributional issues. Hanley et al. (2007, p.14) suggest that “economists would say 
sustainable development is indeed principally an equity rather than an efficiency issue.” 
However, while sustainability and intergenerational equity are interrelated, sustainability on 
its own does not provide an irrefutable notion of intergenerational justice. As Krysiak and 
Krysiak (2006, p.257) comment, sustainability is “a minimal requirement for 
intergenerational justice and not a complete concept of justice in itself”.   The literature 
suggests acknowledgement of the desire to consider the well-being of future generations in 
environmental policy decision-making. However, knowledge of how this desire translates 
more specifically into intergenerational distribution preferences is limited.  
3.0 Questionnaire design 
In the CM experiment which has been undertaken rather than estimating utility as a function 
of the attributes of goods consumed, as in conventional applications, social welfare is the 
dependent variable and the utility levels of different groups, in this case generations, are the 
attributes that are varied. It is the respondent’s conception of social welfare rather than their 
individual utility that is being maximised in the choices being made. Choices between the  
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distribution associated with the status quo and changes in policy resulting in distributional 
changes were presented to respondents. The attributes of the policy options that were varied 
were the levels of utility or well-being of different generations within society. 
A degree of interpersonally comparable cardinal utility must be assumed so that respondents 
are able to make judgements about the well-being of other groups in society. In this 
application it is assumed that respondents use their knowledge of the well-being of groups 
within society under the status quo policy. Arrow et al. (1996) argue that, although SWFs 
have been criticised for assuming interpersonal comparability of utility, there seems to be no 
way of addressing the ethical issues involved in  making decisions affecting different 
generations without making some comparisons implicitly or explicitly about interpersonal 
comparability.  Therefore, decision-making is seen in a broader context of welfare 
maximization within a social structure rather than individuals maximising their utilities. 
Hence, each individual has distributional preferences based on their personal social justice 
preferences.  
Respondents were encouraged to adopt a social welfare perspective by the following 
introduction to the survey instrument: 
  Many environmental policies result in a transfer of both income and resources 
between generations. For example, some environmental policies are paid for by 
current taxpayers with the aim of improving the environment for future generations. 
We are interested in finding out what you think about the way these policies lead to 
gains for some generations and costs for other generations. 
Hypothetical policies with generic labels (A, B, and C) were used as the sources of 
distributional change for  the  choice sets in an attempt to ensure that values other than  
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distribution preferences were not reflected in the respondent’s choices. The attributes in this 
experiment were described in terms of the impact on the utilities of individuals from different 
generations resulting from the three hypothetical and generic policy options. Individuals with 
specific generational characteristics were used as proxies for the group described. Following 
Mackay (1997), a time span of 25 years was taken as a generation. The attributes and levels 
are described in Table 1.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
The chosen design limited the choices to generations currently living acknowledging the 
trade-offs required when considering the cognitive demands placed on respondents. The 
levels of the attributes were described in dollar terms. The dollar terms reflected the change 
in utility to the individual with the specific characteristic described by the attribute. Dollars 
were adopted as a metric with which respondents could associate. The main advantage with 
this numéraire is that dollars are a common and well understood metric to respondents. 
However, respondents were advised in the following way that the dollar values represented 
the general utility of the individuals, and should not be interpreted as financial wealth alone: 
  In this survey, dollars have been used to measure the gains and losses to different 
generations. The dollar amounts represent gains and losses from changes to access to 
environmental resources such as air, water, forests and beaches as well as monetary 
wealth.  
It is recognised that a disadvantage associated with this choice of numéraire is the difficulty 
for respondents to think in terms of general well-being or welfare and not just monetary  
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income. The distribution of preferences may be sensitive to the choice of numéraire and it is 
possible that if a different numéraire was applied, the distributional preferences may vary.   
The levels of the attributes involve the manipulation of attribute differences, not absolute 
values of the attributes.  The hypothetical dollar values represent a one-off loss or gain to the 
individual representing the group described by the specific characteristic determining the 
attribute. In this case, there are five levels for each attribute with each level varying well-
being to the value of A$500.  
A fractional factorial design taken from Lazari and Anderson (1994) was used to create 25 
choice sets, an example of which is presented in Figure 1. The 25 sets were blocked into 
groups of five so that each respondent was presented with five choice sets in a survey. 
Respondents were provided with a reference key such as that in Figure 2 when asked to 
complete the choice sets.  
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
 
The  survey was conducted in July 2005 across a random sample of households in 
Warrnambool, a regional city in South West Victoria, Australia.  A personal drop off and 
pick up form of distribution and collection was used. A total of 431 questionnaires were 
distributed. Of the 337 that were collected or returned by mail, 295 were usable giving a 
response rate of 68.5 per cent. Each of the 295 usable responses included five completed 
choice sets giving a total of 1475 completed choice sets. Each respondent also completed 
socio-demographic questions and two qualitative questions; one regarding specific strategies 
they had employed in answering the choice set questions and one regarding general  
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comments they wished to make about the survey. Comparison of the survey sample’s socio-
demographics with the Australian Bureau of Statistics (2001) census data indicates a slightly 
higher representation of females and younger people completing the survey than in the 
general population.   
4.0 Analysis 
The results of the linear estimation of the CM application are presented in Scarborough and 
Bennett (2008). In order to further explore the decision-making strategies of respondents in 
applying social justice principles to distributional change this paper focuses on the estimation 
of non-linear social welfare functions within a conventional conditional logit framework. 
This approach extends the analysis of social welfare maximisation beyond the classical 
utilitarian framework.  
The  results of the linear  models  reported in Scarborough and Bennett (2008) reveal a 
preference for a form of inequality with respondents placing  differential weights  on the 
different groups.  More specifically, the results reveal positive preferences toward the 
youngest of the three generations. From this it could be inferred that respondents would 
prefer to allocate any given transfer entirely to the most favoured group; that is newborns. 
However, this result could be a consequence of the linear welfare functions employed. The 
estimation of non-linear functions allows for the possibility that the SMRS changes as the 
allocations between age groups vary. If this is the case, then it implies inequality aversion 
that may, at some point, offset the preferences implied by the unequal weighting of marginal 
allocations to different groups. The non-linear models have been estimated using Biogeme 
and following a brief description of each model the results are compared in section 4.4. For  
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ease of estimation the following models have been estimated with the socio-demographic 
variables excluded.   
4.1 Mean variance model 
In order to determine whether respondents displayed an aversion to inequality  in the 
distribution of utility between the three generations a  mean variance model has been 
estimated. This assumes that social welfare, as defined in equation (3), depends on both the 
aggregate utility to the three generations, and the variation in return between them.   
   
 
                      (3) 
Where    
 
                      (4) 
and β and T are the different weights and transfers. 
Thus, in estimating the variance the weighted transfers between generations have been used 
rather than the actual utilities.  Table 2 summarises the results of the model. The standard 
deviation variable (α) is negative and significant suggesting an aversion by the respondent 
sample to inequality in distribution between the different generations.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
  




4.2 Standard exponential model 
A standard exponential model has also been estimated. In this case, alpha (α) is a measure of 
the absolute inequality aversion. The advantage of this model is that the negative utility 
transfers included in the experimental design can be incorporated. In this case the social 
welfare function is expressed as: 
 
                                   (5) 
Table 3  summarises the results of the exponential model. In this model the measure of 
inequality aversion (α) is not significant at the five percent level indicating that it is the 
direction of inequality in terms of gains and losses that is significant in respondents’ decision-
making. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
4.3 Constant Elasticity Social Welfare Function (CES) 
As the results of the mean variance model suggest curvature in the SWF  representing 
intergenerational distribution  preferences, a constant elasticity function was estimated to 
further explore the shape of the SWF.  Elaboration of the constant elasticity of substitution  
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function is provided in Burton (2002). The results of the estimation of the welfare function 
expressed in equation (6) are summarised in Table 4.  
 
                            (6) 
An assumption regarding the base level of utility is required for this model as otherwise 
infeasible regions in the estimation are entered due to negative transfers. For this reason, a 
grid search with varying base levels of utility was undertaken. In the choice experiment the 
transfers between generations are measured in changes in utility to the value of A$500 and 
hence this gives some guidance on what might be reasonable values. However, whether the 
base level was five or fifty had little effect on the results so a base level of five has been 
reported. The critical thing to note is that as the value of the baseline utility is changed 
estimates of alpha are altered, but the log likelihoods do not change at all: essentially there is 
indeterminacy between the two values, although the betas do not change. Results for the scale 
parameter are also reported. As with the mean variance model, alpha is significant thereby 
indicating a degree of inequality aversion by respondents and curvature in the estimated 
SWF. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
4.4 Comparison of the models 
The above models have been compared in order to further understand the heuristics employed 
by respondents in this social welfare context. The analysis has identified two competing 
social justice principles being applied by respondents; a desire to positively favour the  
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younger generations and an aversion to inequality in the distribution between the three 
generations. Of particular interest is how respondents balanced these competing equity 
principles  when faced with choice sets indicating possible distributional change. “Equity 
equivalents”, analogous to certainty equivalents, have been calculated to explore the trade-off 
employed by respondents between social justice principles.  
Results from all models indicate that, for marginal changes, respondents  place a higher 
weight on the utility of newborns.  This suggests  that if respondents had utility to the 
equivalent of one thousand dollars to allocate, they would prefer that it all should be allocated 
to newborns. However, allocating all transfers to this group would maximise the inequality of 
the distribution.  The “equity equivalent” is the minimum total allocation that will generate 
the same welfare as an unequal allocation solely to the newborn group. Two forms of this can 
be  considered: allowing only positive (or zero) allocations to groups, or also  permitting 
reallocations of existing utility between groups. The results of these estimations are reported 
in Table 5.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
The results of the three models are consistent in showing that because of the differential 
weights placed on the three groups respondents prefer to take utility away from the older age 
group and re-allocate  utility gains to the newborn  and aged 25  groups.  In cases where 
negative transfers  are allowed, there are significant reductions in total transfers, largely 
achieved by reallocating away from the older age group. For example, the “equity 
equivalent” transfers with the mean variance model suggest that the same level of welfare as 
that achieved by allocating utility to the value of A$1000 to the newborn group could be  
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achieved by a total allocation of utility to the value of A$850; with a utility loss to the value 
of A$360 to the aged 50 group, a utility gain to the value of A$500 to the aged 25 group and 
a utility gain to the value of A$710 to the newborn group.  
In a policy sense it may be more appropriate to only consider the possibility of positive 
transfers (Table 5b).  In this case, where only positive allocations are allowed, the CES and 
standard exponential welfare functions show relatively little reduction in the total transfer can 
be achieved by allowing for the social welfare improving reduction in inequality. The effect 
is greater with the mean variance model but not substantial. This suggests that, although 
statistically significant, the curvature in the SWF is slight.  
5.0 Discussion and conclusion 
Economists have long been aware of the conflicting equity principles influencing social 
justice preferences. The egalitarian principle of each group or person being treated equally, 
which is the foundation of the classical utilitarian  SWF,  is often assumed to be the 
overarching principle to be applied in the consideration of equity objectives. This research 
finds that in terms of one area of distribution, the distribution of utility between generations, 
the classical utilitarian SWF may not accurately reflect the social justice preferences of the 
community.  
Driving these findings is the positive preferences toward the younger generations evident in 
the data set. This suggests that the heuristics employed by respondents in the stated 
preference context, when choosing between distributional changes resulting from potential 
natural resource policy changes,  are  more complex that implied by a classical utilitarian 
SWF. In this case when confronted with alternate intergenerational distribution outcomes, the 
social justice principle of positively favouring one group, that is the youngest of the  
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generations, had a more dominant influence on social decision-making than a preference for 
equality of outcome.  
There are a number of limitations with this research which require further exploration. For 
example; the reference point of the status quo utility distributions is unknown, the magnitude 
of the variance of utility distribution in the experimental design may not have been large 
enough to pick-up the curvature in the SWF
1
                                                 
1 Appreciation to Geoff Kerr for raising this point. 
, and the extent to which respondents were able 
to cognitively move to a welfare maximising context is difficult to assess. It may be that the 
positive preferences toward younger generations also represent utility maximisation and 
interdependent utility functions. Nevertheless, the work also illustrates the potential of stated 
choice methods to enhance understanding of distributional preferences and the decision-
making strategies employed by respondents in a social welfare context.   
The challenge in incorporating equity considerations in the development of environmental 
policy  is considerable and can only be achieved by increasing our understanding of the 
distributional preferences of the community and the social justice principles applied in 
determining these preferences.  
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Table 1: Attributes and levels in intergenerational distribution choice experiment 
Attribute  Levels ($A) 
Utility change Person Aged 50  -$1,000  -$500  +$500  +$1,000  +$1,500 
Utility change Person Aged 25  -$1,000  -$500  +$500  +$1,000  +$1,500 
    Utility change Newborn  -$1,000  -$500  +$500  +$1,000  +$1,500 
  




Table 2: Results of Mean Variance Model 
Variable  Value  Std 
Error 






α  -0.709  0.201  -3.52  0.00  0.212  -3.35  0.00 
asc  0.322  0.104  3.08  0.00  0.109  2.97  0.00 
β1  0.282  0.0453  6.22  0.00  0.0452  6.23  0.00 
β2  0.408  0.0491  8.31  0.00  0.0529  7.72  0.00 
β3  0.646  0.0646  10.12  0.00  0.0648  10.08  0.00 
  




Table 3: Results of Standard Exponential Model 
Variable  Value  Std 
Error 






alpha  0.372  0.199  1.87  0.06  0.212  1.76  0.08 
asc  -3.45  1.93  -1.79  0.07  2.05  -1.69  0.09 
β1  0.806  0.452  1.78  0.07  0.480  1.68  0.09 
β2  1.26  0.693  1.82  0.07  0.754  1.68  0.09 
β3  1.79  0.927  1.93  0.05  0.963  1.86  0.06 
  




Table 4: Results of Constant Elasticity Social Welfare Function 
Variable  Value  Std 
Error 






α  2.01  0.8800    2.28  0.02  0.8820    2.27  0.02 
asc  5.28  0.0687  76.95  0.00  0.0686  77.04  0.00 
β1  0.22  0.0269    8.05  0.00  0.0261    8.30  0.00 
β2  0.32  0.0282  11.33  0.00  0.0297  10.76  0.00 
Utility  5.0   (fixed)           
Homogeneity parameter (µ): 1.34   0.103   13.02 
  




Table 5: Equivalent transfers for $1000 allocated to newborns only 
a): Negative transfers allowed 





Aged50  -350  - 830  -360 
Aged25   290     360   500 
Newborn   980  1,310   710 
Total   930     840   850 
 
b) Only positive transfers allowed 





Aged50      0      0      0 
Aged25   160     30   280 
Newborn   830   970   610 
Total   990   1000   890  
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Figure 1: Example of an intergenerational utility distribution choice set 
 
Figure 2: Reference key for choice set in Figure 1  
  
Scarborough, Burton and Bennett    Page 23 
 
References 
Agyeman, J., Bullard, R. and Evans, B. (Eds.) (2003) Just Sustainabilities: Development in 
an Unequal World. Earthscan, London. 
Arrow, K., Cline, W., Mäler, K.-G., Munaginghe, M., and Stiglitz, J. (1996) Intertemporal 
Equity, Discounting, and Economic Efficiency in Climate Change 1995, Bruce, J., 
Lee, H. and Haites, E., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (2001)  Census of Population and Housing. 
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 
Banuri, K., Mäler, K.-G., Grubb, M., Jacobson, H.  and Yamin, F. (1996) Equity and Social 
Considerations in Climate Change 1995. Bruce, J., Lee, H. and Haites, E., Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Bentham, J. (1789) An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,  Payne, 
London. [Also Clarendon Press, Oxford (1907).] 
Burton, M. (2002) A Fair Go: Attitudes towards equity in natural resource management in 
WA. Contributed paper, AARES Annual Conference, 2002 
Cowell, F. and Gardiner, K. (1999)  Welfare Weights,  Report to the UK Office of Fair 
Trading, United Kingdom. 
Edgeworth, F. Y. (1881). Mathematical Psychics. Kegan Paul, London. 
Hanley, N., Shogren, J. and White, B. (2007) Environmental Economics: In Theory and 
Practice. 2nd. Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire.  
Scarborough, Burton and Bennett    Page 24 
 
Johansson, P.-O. (1987) The Economic Theory and Measurement of Environmental Benefits. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Kopp, R. J. and Portney, P. R. (1999). Mock Referenda for Intergenerational Decisionmaking 
in Discounting and Intergenerational Equity. P. R. Portney and Weyant, J. P. 
Kristöm, B. (2006). Framework for Assessing the Distribution of Financial Effects of 
Environmental Policy in The Distributional Effects of Environmental Policy. Y. Serret 
and Johnstone, N. Edward Elgar. Cheltenham, U.K. 
Krysiak, F. and Krysiak, D. (2006) "Sustainability with uncertain future preferences." 
Environmental & Resource Economics, 33: 511-531. 
Lazari, A. and Anderson, D. (1994) "Designs of discrete choice set experiments for 
establishing both attribute and availability cross effects."  Journal of Marketing 
Research, XXX1: 375-383. 
Mackay, H. (1997) Generations: Baby Boomers, Their Parents & Their Children. Macmillan, 
Sydney. 
Marshall, A. (1890) Principles of Economics. Macmillan, London. 
Mill, J. (1861) Utilitarianism. London. 
Myles, G. (1995) Public Economics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Pearce, D. (2006) Framework for Assessing the Distribution of Environmental Quality in The 
Distributional Effects of Environmental Policy. Serret, Y. and Johnstone, N.,Edward 
Elgar. Cheltenham, UK.  
Scarborough, Burton and Bennett    Page 25 
 
Pezzey, J. (1989) "Economic Analysis of Sustainable Growth and Sustainable Development." 
World Bank Environment Department Working Paper 15. World Bank, Washington 
DC. 
Pigou, A. (1920) The Economics of Welfare. Macmillan, London. 
Ramsey, F. (1928) "A Mathematical Theory of Savings." Economic Journal, 38: 543-549. 
Randall, A. (1987). Resource Economics: An Economic Approach to Natural Resource and 
Environmental Policy. 2nd Edition John Wiley, New York 
Scarborough, H. and Bennett, J. (2008). "Estimating intergenerational distribution 
preferences."  Ecological Economics 66: 575-583. 
Sen, A. (2000) Social Justice and the Distribution of Income. in Handbook of Income 
Distribution. Atkinson A. and Bourguignon, F., North Holland, Amsterdam. 
Serret, Y. and Johnstone, N. (2006)  The Distributional Effects of Environmental Policy. 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK.Tietenberg, T. (2006)  Environmental and Natural 
Resource Economics. 7th Edition Pearson, Boston. 
Tietenberg, T. (2009) Environmental and Natural Resource Economics. 8th Edition Pearson, 
Boston. 